Dutch retail trade on the rise? Relation between competition, innovation and productivity by Harold Creusen et al.
 





Dutch retail trade on the rise? 
Relation between competition, innovation and productivity 
 






CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 
Van Stolkweg 14 
P.O. Box 80510 
2508 GM  The Hague, the Netherlands 
 
Telephone  +31 70 338 33 80 
Telefax  +31 70 338 33 50 






ISBN 30-5833-304-3  
  3 
Abstract in English 
The Dutch retail trade demonstrated a relatively meagre performance in terms of productivity 
(growth) during the 1990s, especially seen from an international perspective. This study 
analyses the productivity performance of the Dutch retail trade in more detail, and focuses on 
competition and innovation as two main drivers of productivity growth. More precisely, it takes 
the mutual relationship between competition, innovation and productivity explicitly into 
account. Between 1993 and 2002 changes in competition varied substantially within the retail 
trade. However, on average competition slightly declined. Furthermore, only a few firms in the 
Dutch retail trade innovate. Regression analysis reveals that both competition and innovation 
enhance productivity growth directly. Further, fiercer competition induces more innovation, and 
consequently also raises productivity indirectly via innovation.  
 
Key words: competition, innovation, productivity, measurement, productivity policy 
 
JEL code: D24, L1, L5, L81, O31. 
Abstract in Dutch 
Gedurende de jaren negentig boekte de Nederlandse detailhandel, nationaal en internationaal 
gezien, magere resultaten in termen van productiviteit. Deze studie analyseert de Nederlandse 
detailhandel in meer detail. Het richt zich vooral op concurrentie en innovatie als drijfveren van 
productiviteitsgroei, alsook de onderlinge relatie tussen concurrentie en innovatie. Tussen 1993 
en 2002 liepen de veranderingen in concurrentie in de verschillende onderdelen van de 
detailhandel uiteen. Gemiddeld genomen is de concurrentie in de detailhandel licht gedaald. 
Daarnaast hebben weinig bedrijven in de detailhandel aan innovatie gedaan. Regressieresultaten 
tonen aan dat zowel concurrentie als innovatie positief bijdragen aan productiviteit. Verder leidt 
een hoger concurrentieniveau tot meer innovatie, en dus ook langs deze weg tot extra 
productiviteit.  
 
Steekwoorden: concurrentie, innovatie, productiviteit, maatstaven, productiviteitsbeleid  
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Preface 
The relatively meagre performance in terms of productivity (growth) of the Dutch retail trade 
during the 1990s may be reason for concern. In this study two main drivers of productivity 
growth are distinguished and analysed, namely competition and innovation. These drivers may 
serve as instruments for policy to enhance the productivity of this industry. The performance of 
the Dutch retail trade is analysed for the period 1993-2002. Conclusions are derived from a 
model that investigates competition, innovation, and productivity in detail. The model explicitly 
takes the relations between these three variables into account. The empirical analysis rests on a 
vast amount of firm-level data of the Dutch retail trade, including data from the ‘Community 
Innovation Survey’.  
 
The project was carried out by Henry van der Wiel (project leader), Harold Creusen, Björn 
Vroomen and Fred Kuypers. They thank Stephan Raes and Anne Reitsma (Ministry of 
Economic Affairs), Maarten Cornet, Free Huizinga, Bert Minne, and Bert Smid (CPB 
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis) for valuable comments on earlier drafts. 
They also benefited from the advice and assistance on data and econometric issues of George 
van Leeuwen (Statistics Netherlands). In addition, they thank participants of the CAED/BLD 
conference in Cardiff (August, 2005), the workshop on “Innovation, Competition, and 
Productivity” in Sophia-Antipolis (December, 2005) and the ISS Schumpeter Conference 2006 
in Sophia-Antipolis (June, 2006) for their valuable comments. The data analysis reported in this 
document was carried out at the Centre for Research of Economic Micro data (CEREM) of 
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Summary 
Research questions 
Although the labour productivity per hour worked in the Dutch retail trade is still above the EU 
average, the industry is loosing its favourable position. European productivity growth is 
stronger since the end of the 1980s. Moreover, the Dutch retail trade could not keep track with 
the strong growth of the US retail trade since the mid 1990s. According to McKinsey (1997), 
the poor productivity performance of the Dutch retail trade was due to less competition and less 
innovations. Recently, the American Conference Board affirmed these findings for the EU-
retail trade in general (McGuckin et al., 2005). 
 
In that regard, Dutch policy has taken several measures such as the new Competition Act in 
1998 to stimulate competition in product markets including the retail trade. Moreover, retailers 
have been allowed having longer opening hours since 1996. 
 
This study focuses on the following questions: 
·  Did competition in the Dutch retail trade change during the 1990s and early 2000s, and what are 
the main drivers of these changes? 
·  Did competition affect innovation intensity in this industry? 
·  Did competition and innovation affect labour productivity (growth) in this industry? 
 
This study has two main limitations. First, one should note that we do not investigate 
employment legislation and innovation policies. These policy instruments are of importance to 
the performance of the Dutch retail trade as well. In addition, we only considered the period 
1993-2002 and therefore cannot provide insights into the relation between competition levels 
and potential causes of the current ‘price war’ between supermarkets. 
Main conclusions 
Findings of this study suggest that fiercer competition and more innovation may stimulate 
productivity growth in the Dutch retail trade. Even more, an increase in competition stimulates 
innovation. The latter induces therefore an additional effect of competition on productivity via 
innovation. However, on average competition in the retail trade slightly declined between 1993 
and 2002. Competition partly became less fierce due to the considerable growth of market 
demand. Finally, only a few firms in the Dutch retail trade innovate.  
Theory on competition, innovation and productivity 
In general, competition may increase productivity through two channels. First, competition may 




indirect channel is through a positive effect on innovation. Innovation is generally thought to 
raise labour productivity. Competition may on its turn stimulate innovation as firms might 
increase their innovative effort in order to escape intensifying competitive pressure. This is 
called the ‘escape competition’ effect. However, competition can be not conducive to 
innovation. This negative effect on innovation arises from the ‘Schumpeter’ effect, which states 
that (inefficient) firms will reduce their innovative effort in case of fiercer competition, because 
then their gain from innovation will become too low. Recent literature suggests that the 
combination of both effects may result in an inverted U-relationship between competition and 
innovation.  
 
Obviously, if there is a positive relationship between competition and innovation (the second 
channel), the overall effect of competition on labour productivity is positive. However, if an 
inverted U-relationship between competition and innovation exists then the overall effect of 
competition on productivity is ambiguous.  
Data 
Three data sources obtained from Statistics Netherlands are applied for the analysis of the 
Dutch retail trade. Both developments in competition and labour productivity are mapped by 
firm-level data from the surveys of the ‘Production Statistics’. Innovation data are derived from 
three consecutive Community Innovation Surveys (CIS). Finally, data on the entry and exit of 
firms come from the General Firm Register (in Dutch: ABR). The retail trade includes the SIC 
52 industries ranging from supermarkets, department stores to chemists. 
Results 
The relative profits measure, as indicator of competition, demonstrates that competition in the 
Dutch retail trade at the SIC 5-digit level varied widely in terms of size and change between 
1993 and 2002. However, competition in the retail trade as a whole slightly declined in this 
period. Using a similar model as in Creusen et al. (2006b), our findings suggest that the 
considerable growth of market demand may have weakened competition. Although explicit 
conclusions are difficult to draw, regulatory reforms seem to go along with an increase in 
competition. 
 
The regression results provide no indications of an inverted U-relationship between competition 
and innovation for the Dutch retail trade. In contrast, the results suggest that more competition 
unambiguously enhances both the decision to innovate and the innovation outlays. Further, it 
turns out that less than 30 per cent of the sampled firms in the retail trade innovate.  
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Finally, our findings suggest that both competition and innovation have had a positive and 
significant effect on productivity. Therefore, more competition and more innovation in the 
Dutch retail trade can enhance productivity growth in the short term. Hence, the overall effect 
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1  Introduction 
Everyone is very familiar with the retail trade.
1 Each of us has frequently or even daily contact 
with this part of the economy. In fact, the retail trade acts as an intermediate between producers 
and consumers. The industry is responsible for a considerable part of output and employment of 
industrialised countries, including the Netherlands. For example, the share of nominal value 
added from this industry was approximately 4 percent in 2000 for the Netherlands. In terms of 
employment, the share is even larger and accounts for more than 7 percent of total employment 
in full-time equivalents.  
 
According to several sources the labour productivity level and productivity growth in the Dutch 
retail trade was not outstanding in international perspective in the 1990s (McKinsey, 1997, 
OECD, 2004). Although, the Dutch labour productivity per hour worked is above the EU-
average, it is much lower than in the US as it could not keep track with the strong productivity 
growth of the US retail trade after 1995. For example, during the period 1997-2002 the 
productivity growth per hours worked of the Dutch retail trade equals 2.1 per cent, whereas the 
US obtained a productivity growth of 7.4 per cent (RUG 2004, GGDC 60-industry database). 
Also in a longer perspective the Dutch productivity growth performance is less favourable than 
for the EU as a whole. 
 
This economic performance of the Dutch retail trade might be reason for policy concern. The 
Conference Board (TCB) states that “… over [a] half of the economy-wide productivity growth 
lead of the US over Europe after 1995 is accounted for by diverging performance in wholesale 
and retail trade” (McGuckin et al., 2005). According to the TCB, slow adoption of new 
technologies and differences in legislation may explain the lag of the EU retail trade. This 
corresponds with earlier findings for the Dutch retail trade of McKinsey in 1997 (McKinsey, 
1997) indicating that both aspects are characteristic for the meagre performance of this sector.  
 
In the 1990s Dutch policy took various measures to enhance competitive forces in product and 
labour markets, which are in-line with reforms in other OECD countries. Two major regulatory 
reforms can be distinguished for the Dutch retail trade. First, a new competition law has been 
enacted in 1998. Second, several specific reforms have been set up with the aim to increase 
competition, deregulate and improve quality of regulations of specific markets (so called 
MDW-operation). The most important MDW-project for the retail trade concerns the 
liberalisation of shop opening hours in 1996. 
  
These considerations and developments give rise to the following research questions: 
 
1 We define the retail trade according to the SIC 52-code, this includes industries like supermarkets, department stores, 




·  Did competition in the Dutch retail trade change during the 1990s and early 2000s, and what are 
the main drivers of these changes? 
·  Did competition affect innovation intensity in this industry? 
·  Did competition and innovation affect labour productivity (growth) in this industry? 
 
The issues are relevant for two respective reasons. First, recent literature points out that the 
relation between competition and innovation is ambiguous, as it may follow an inverted U-
shape (see Aghion et al., 2002). Second, a positive impact of policy measures on competition 
may be counteracted by negative effects from other determinants, such as the strong economic 
growth in the 1990s (see Creusen et al., 2006b).  
 
Using firm-level data for the Dutch retail trade covering the period 1993-2002, we analyse 
competition, innovation and productivity over time, and analyse their mutual relationship. To 
our knowledge current studies have only considered separate parts of this three-way 
relationship. Note that we do not investigate employment legislation and innovation policies. 
Both policy instruments are of importance to the performance of the Dutch retail trade as well, 
next to competition. In addition, due to data availability at the time of research, the period at 
issue in this study is before the current price war in the supermarkets, which started in 2003. We 
therefore do not go into causes and implications of this recent development.  
 
The structure of this study is as follows. In chapter 2 we discuss the characteristics of the Dutch 
retail trade with a focus on productivity performance in an international and national 
perspective, and on regulatory reforms. Chapter 3 explores the available data and introduces 
several key variables. Finally, chapter 4 provides several theoretical considerations and it 
presents empirical findings on the relations between competition, innovation and productivity in 
the Dutch retail trade.  
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2  The Dutch retail trade 
The Dutch retail trade is continuously liable to changes in consumers’ shopping behaviour, firms’ 
competitive behaviour and to regulatory reforms. In the 1990s, the level of labour productivity of the Dutch 
retail trade was higher than the EU average, but dropped behind the US after its strong productivity boom. 
During the 1990s, several regulatory reforms have taken place, such as the enactment of the new 
Competition Act in 1998. These reforms were introduced to enhance the level of competition in the Dutch 
retail trade in order to stimulate productivity growth.  
2.1  Characteristics of Dutch retail trade 
The retail trade is an industry which is continuously transforming and in most countries it is still 
in the midst of a process of structural change. Beginning at the end of the 1950s with the 
appearance of the self-service shops and supermarkets, the retail trade has undergone a 
tremendous metamorphosis. Recent major trends that can be distinguished include larger 
outlets, consolidation into retail chains, spreading of hypermarkets and increased vertical 
integration.  

















































































































number of firms (left axis) production, prices 1987 (right axis)  
Sources: number of enterprises: Statistics Netherlands, Statline, Historie economische demografie production in prices of 1987: Statistics 
Netherlands, National Accounts. 
Figure 2.1 summarises these developments in terms of the number of firms and output levels, 
pointing at larger firms. Despite the considerable pickup from 1996 to 1998 the number of firms 





2 Note that this temporary pickup partly matches with the upturn in the business 
cycle at that time, but it also corresponds to the introduction of the longer opening hours in 
1996 (see section 2.3.2). This pattern is less visible in the output of the industry. 
 
Three major forces play an important role in this ongoing transformation of the (Dutch) retail 
trade; (1) consumers, (2) the government and (3) retailers themselves. First, the shopping 
behaviour of consumers is continuously changing. These changes are to a great extent 
determined by factors such as increases in income, more part-time workers, higher participation 
rates of women on the labour market and greater mobility (including an increase in car-
ownership). For example, during the week time is precious and as shopping is time consuming, 
consumers increasingly prefer stores or locations where they can buy more products at once 
(that is, one-stop shopping, large shopping centres). However, consumers also spent more time 
on fun-shopping, as they perceive shopping as a form of recreation. Both shopping events give 
a good example of different expectations consumer may have of a shopping trip. Consequently, 
this translates into different expectations of the store/location the consumer plans to visit. 
 
The second important force in the transformation is the role of the government. As we will 
discuss more extensively in section 2.3, legislation has shaped the structure of the Dutch retail 
trade for decades. A number of regulatory reforms may have affected competition in the retail 
trade as well.  
 
Finally, retailers are continuously transforming their business concepts. Partially, this is a 
response to changing consumer behaviour and legislation. For example, supermarkets 
introduced more ready-to-eat meals to accommodate consumers’ shortage of time and large 
shopping centres appear at several designated locations at the periphery of towns. But firms in 
retail trade may take various actions to reduce cost and enhance their competitive advantage. 
On the one hand, economies of scale can be pursued via larger outlets and consolidation into 
retail chains. On the other hand, economies of scope can be pursued via horizontal integration. 
For example, stores specialised in household appliances now sell also DVD-players and 
computers. In addition, technological developments, especially in the area of ICT, have altered 
logistic operations in the retail trade. For example, stock control is continuously optimised with 
the use of scanner data.  
 
These three transformations may have altered the type of competition in the Dutch retail trade. 
Price levels in combination with product quality remain the main instrument of competition as 
is demonstrated by the recent ‘price-war’ between supermarkets. However, also the store itself 
 
2 Although the number of shops also declined over time, this reduction was smaller indicating that the shops per firm 
increased due to consolidation.   
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and the assortment offered are instruments of competition. For example, we already indicated 
the difference between fun-shopping and daily or one-stop shopping, which influences the 
characteristics of a store like assortment and service level. In addition, fun-shopping as a 
recreational activity induces more competition between retailers on the one hand and, for 
example, museums and cinemas on the other hand, as they all compete for the spare time of 
consumers. Another example of changing settings among competitors is that supermarkets with 
an increased assortment of ready-to-eat meals are becoming competitors of (fast-food) 
restaurants. To put it differently, a bundle of products have become closer substitutes over time. 
2.2  Productivity performance of the Dutch retail trade 
2.2.1  An international perspective 
Reports of the OECD (2004) and McKinsey (1997, see box below) mention the under average 
performance of the Dutch retail trade. Figure 2.2 displays labour productivity per hours worked 
for several countries relative to the EU-average (EU=100).
3,4 










































































































Netherlands France Sweden US  
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre, 60-Industry Database, February 2005, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, 
http://www.ggdc.net 
 
3 Measurement issues often hamper a productivity analysis, especially in services sectors like the retail trade. Difficulties in 
measuring output, quality and labour input in terms of hours hinder to gauge the efficiency in these industries. 
4 Productivity is a key indicator for the efficiency of a particular firm, industry or for the economy at large. Productivity can be 
expressed in terms of labour productivity or in terms of total factor productivity (TFP). Labour productivity is a partial 
productivity concept relating only output to labour. TFP is defined as labour productivity adjusted for (changes in) capital 
intensity and use of economies of scale within the same technology. TFP growth merely reflects the productivity changes 





Since 1995 the US labour productivity growth accelerated compared to the EU, and the US 
productivity level quickly caught up and surpassed the Dutch and French retail trade. The 
labour productivity in Sweden was initially below the EU average, and could neither keep track 
with the strong US growth pattern. However, it did catch up with the Netherlands around 2000 
and is heading towards France with a growth pattern in-line with the US. Still, the differences 
between the EU-countries and the US in 2002 demonstrate that the productivity gap has become 
substantial, and that EU-countries may have a considerable catch-up bonus to collect. 
 
Focussing on the Netherlands, we see that until 1987 the Dutch retail trade demonstrated a 
stronger growth pattern than the EU. But after that the lead in productivity compared to the EU 
gradually declined and levelled off just above the EU-average. Further, between 1987 and 1995 
the Dutch retail trade had a somewhat higher productivity level than the US retail trade. Like 
other EU-countries, the Dutch retail trade could not follow the steep productivity growth of the 
US since 1996.  
 
The TCB attributes the lag in productivity growth of EU-retailers to US retailers to five 
determinants (see McGuckin et al., 2005). These determinants are (1) the head-start US retail 
trade in the adoption of new (ICT) technologies, (2) the regulatory obstacles within and 
McKinsey very critical to Dutch retail trade 
In  1997  McKinsey  in  cooperation  with  the  Max  Geldensstichting,  extensively  analysed  the  Dutch  economy  (see 
McKinsey, 1997). One of the case studies was the performance of the Dutch retail trade. Based on their findings, 
McKinsey  was  very  critical  to  the  Dutch  retail  trade.  According  to  McKinsey,  the  Dutch  retail  trade  is  a  sector 
characterised by lack of competition and lack of incentives to create and seek jobs, inflexible work and compensation 
legislation,  limited  opening  hours  (in  spite  of  deregulation  in  1996),  restrictive  zoning  laws  and  slow  innovation. 
McKinsey proposed three main actions which should boost Dutch retail : 
 
·  Reform the labour market by increasing incentives to employ and seek work, and by reducing complexity and 
inflexibility of Collective Labour Agreements (CAO, in Dutch: “Collective Arbeidsovereenkomst”) 
·  Stimulate competition by enforcing the New Competition Act and removing the ban on parallel imports and create 
more out-of-town shopping centres with large anchors and small-scale retail chains 
·  Innovate with new formats. Retailers should consider differentiation, faster innovation and adding more service 
 
McKinsey  stated  that  the  Dutch  retail  trade  has  the  potential  to  increase  output  and  employment.  Its  lagging 
performance is partly related to consumer preferences, the functioning of the labour market and regulation of physical 
planning and municipal zoning schemes that designate retail outlet sites.   
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between EU-countries, (3) the scale advantage of the US retail trade,
5 (4) the slower 
complementary changes in the EU,
6 and (5) culture and taste differences across Europe.  
 
Gordon also emphasizes the impediments in some EU-countries to develop “big box” retail 
formats (see Gordon, 2004). Following Phelps (2003), Gordon also points to Europe’s 
underdevelopment of capitalists’ institutions like venture capital, the overdevelopment of 
corporatist institutions such as employee participation in management and business licensing, 
social cultural differences and different view on environmental planning.  
 
With regard to the number of outlets per 10,000 inhabitants the Dutch retail trade has fewer 
outlets than the EU-average (see table 2.1). The Netherlands are however characterised by a 
high population density. This may enable retailers to obtain economies of scale via larger 
outlets as they can serve a large group of consumers from one location. The size of the 
enterprises in terms of employees is above the EU-average. The latter effect is mainly due to the 
high Dutch part-time factor. Recent Dutch figures from Statistics Netherlands show that in 2000 
the average firm in the retail trade employs about 5.7 full-time equivalents. 
Table 2.1  Key figures on efficiency levels of the retail trade, 2000 
  Labour productivity
a, b  Outlet density
c  Employees per enterprise 
       
Netherlands  110  54  8.5 
Belgium  106  80  3.5 
Germany  105  35  9.0 
France  125  64  4.2 
United Kingdom  83  36  14.2 
Sweden  108  65  4.3 
       
European Union  100  71  6.3 
United States  138  .  . 
  a
 Value added per hours worked, EU = 100. 
b
 Source: RUG (2004), GGDC, 60-Industry database. 
c Outlet density is defined as number of enterprises per 10,000 inhabitants.  
Source: OECD (2004). 
 
2.2.2  A national perspective  
In addition to the international comparison we provide in table 2.2 figures on the performance 
of the Dutch retail trade compared to other industries in the Netherlands. In terms of value 
added (prices of 1995) the share of the retail trade remains quite stable at just over 4 per cent in 
 
5 The TCB indicates the reduced opportunity of cross-border scale in the EU as a factor for lower productivity levels 
compared to the US. Our study purely focuses on the Dutch market itself and it indicates that the retail trade is characterised 
by constant returns to scale for larger firms (see chapter 4). 




the 1990s, whereas other Dutch services industries experienced a rise of their share in the Dutch 
economy. 
Table 2.2  Dutch retail trade in a national perspective, 1990-2002 
                       Share in economy              Labour productivity in hours 
  1990  2000  1991-2000  1991-1996  1997-2002 
  % of total value in prices 1995                        Annual growth rates in % 
           
Total economy  100.0  100.0  1.2  0.9  1.2 
Market sector  69.0  73.0  1.5  1.0  1.8 
  Manufacturing  18.0  16.9  2.9  3.0  2.1 
  Services  46.7  53.2  1.1  0.4  1.7 
  Retail trade  4.1  4.1  1.2  0.4  1.7 
 
Source: CBS, National Account data 2003. 
 
The figures on the labour productivity growth reveal that the growth rates of the retail trade are 
lower than the growth rates of the market sector. However they are similar to the values for 
services as a whole. Moreover, linked to the upturn in the business cycle growth over the period 
1997-2002 has improved for the Dutch retail trade. 
 
The relatively meagre productivity growth in the retail trade, particularly between 1991 and 
1996, may point to other factors besides the decline in economic growth. Studies of the OECD 
(2002) and Van der Wiel (2001) indicate that the poor growth performance in this period might 
be caused by the relatively low use of ICT technology when compared to other countries.  
2.3  Regulatory changes in Dutch retail trade 
During the 1990s several regulations have changed the institutional setting of the Dutch retail 
trade. We will first briefly discuss some general changes followed by a more extensive 
discussion on several regulations specific for the Dutch retail trade.  
2.3.1  Main regulatory changes 
Most OECD-countries have shifted their attitude from tight government control to a confidence 
in market mechanisms and incentives to enhance welfare in the 1990s (see Gonenc et al., 2000). 
In this regard, the new Competition Act of 1998 is of importance as it may have affected the 
intensity of competition in the Dutch retail trade. Following practices in other European 
countries, the Netherlands changed its competition policy to a prohibitive system.
7 The new 
Competition Act explicitly prohibits abuse of dominant positions and cartels, except for several 
exemptions such as franchising, purchasing combinations or cooperation in technical research. 
 
7 The previous system was more permissive and allowed, for example, cartels unless they caused needless welfare costs.  
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As result of the new Competition Act, the Dutch Competition Authority (NMa) was founded to 
enforce the prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance. In addition, the NMa also 
monitors mergers and take-overs in markets and is therefore an important factor in market 
structure. 
2.3.2  Specific regulatory changes 
A wide range of regulatory restrictions affects the scope of the Dutch retail trade, including 
regulations related to health and safety of employees, urban planning and other environmental 
issues. Besides overall regulatory reforms, the Dutch government deployed specific reforms as 
part of a larger operation called the MDW (Competition, Deregulation, Legislation quality). 
This operation focuses on competition but also on deregulation and the improvement of 
legislation quality (less and uncomplicated regulations).  
 
Three specific regulatory changes within the MDW-operation are directly related to the retail 
trade: (1) the liberalisation of opening hours, (2) PDV/GDV policy (policy on peripheral and 
large-scale retail outlets), and (3) the business licensing requirements or establishment law. 
 
The liberalisation of opening hours is the most important MDW-operation concerning the retail 
trade. Until June 1996, Dutch retailers were not allowed to be open on evenings and on 
Sundays. The new regulation allows retailers to be open from 6 AM to 10 PM. Moreover, shops 
may be open 12 times a year on Sundays and public holidays (these days are assigned by 
municipalities). Under some conditions, retailers are allowed to be open after 10 PM and on 
more than 12 Sundays a year (for example in tourist regions).  
 
Concerning the PDV/GDV policy the Netherlands apply a specific zoning planning policy 
similar to other European countries. That is, the freedom of establishment is restricted by local 
and urban planning laws, particularly for the retail trade. Since 1973, the Netherlands has 
pursued a specific policy regarding the establishment of large retailing formats. In essence, the 
aim of the policy is twofold, i.e. to maintain the function of shops in the inner city or centre of a 
town, and to strengthen competitive forces in this industry. As a result of this policy, it was 
hardly allowed to establish a retail enterprise on the outskirts of a town.
8 This limits market 
entry and protects shops in town centres. During the 1990s this zoning and planning policy (in 
Dutch GDV/PDV-policy) has slightly been changed by extending the allowance of 
establishments on thirteen municipal junctions. More precisely, any type of retail firm is 
allowed to establish in these locations. Further, the zoning policy for the retail trade is 
decentralised to municipal and provincial authorities. 
 
 
8 Only certain types of retail were allowed. These are retailing in dangerous or voluminous products (e.g., fuel, cars and 




Finally, up to 1996, the conditions for entrepreneurs to start a new enterprise are 
constitutionalised in the ‘Vestigingswet Bedrijven 1954’ (Act on Business licensing 
requirements). This act protected consumers against non-capable entrepreneurs in terms of 
reliability, creditability and competencies. The law also protected incumbents against new 
competitors by evoking entry barriers. In 1996, the Dutch Act has been liberalised. In general 
entrepreneurs in the Dutch retail trade only have to fulfil general conditions on entrepreneurs’ 
requirements nowadays. Particularly, the regulations for new retailers became more favourable 
as the main aim of the deregulation was to enlarge market dynamics by simplifying entry.
9  
 
9 In fact, in 1993 the government already allowed firms to enter the market under these less restrictive rules.   
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3  Data and descriptive statistics 
To assess the mutual relationship between competition, innovation and productivity several sources of data 
are used. The relative profits measure, which indicates the developments in competition, demonstrates that 
competition in the Dutch retail trade as a whole became slightly less intense in the period 1993-2002. In 
addition, only a sixth to a third of firms in the retail trade indicated that they have innovated. Finally, 
productivity only slightly increased over time. 
3.1  Data 
Three sources of information are used to obtain a comprehensive overview of the development 
of competition, innovation and productivity, and the interactions between these three variables. 
We use firm-level data from the production statistics (PS, in Dutch “Productiestatistieken”), the 
General Firm Register (ABR, in Dutch: “Algemeen BedrijfsRegister”) as well as data from the 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS), all obtained from Statistics Netherlands. 
Production Statistics 
The PS-data provide a complete coverage of firms with at least 20 employees. Firms with fewer 
than 20 employees are sampled. The accounting data in the PS include, among other variables, 
the following key variables: total sales
10, employment in full time equivalents and in persons, 
intermediate inputs
11, wages (including social security charges), and depreciation costs.  
The PS-data cover the period 1993-2002 and contain information on five per cent of the 
total population of firms in the Dutch retail trade. Table 3.1 presents some statistics based on 
these PS-data. Comparing the firms in the PS-dataset with the population, we see that the PS 
contain on average firms with more employees and slightly higher productivity levels than the 
average of the total population.
12  
General Firm Register 
Information on the number of firms active in the retail trade is derived from the ABR data set. 
This set contains information for each firm on its SIC-code, its date of birth and its date of death 
(if relevant). From these figures we can determine the total number of firms in the retail sector, 
as well as the entry and exit rate.
13  
 
10 I.e. the value added by trade activities, calculated as the gross sales of traded goods minus the purchasing costs of traded 
goods. 
11 Excluding purchasing costs of traded goods. 
12 To obtain estimates of the inputs and sales at an aggregated level such as an industry, sampled firms are multiplied with a 
raising factor. This factor is a ratio of the number of sampled firms to the total of firms in the same stratum of the population. 
This raising factor is provided by Statistics Netherlands. 
13 I.e. the number of firms that entered and/or exited during some year as a percentage of the total number of firms at the 





We further employ three consecutive waves of the CIS, i.e. the CIS 2, CIS 2.5 and CIS 3 
survey. These surveys cover, respectively, the periods 1994-1996, 1996-1998 and 1998-2000. 
The CIS provides firm-level data and consists of a sample of firms, which is smaller than the 
sample of the PS. Furthermore, the sample covers only firms with 5 or more employees. 
Consequently, this censoring omits a substantial part of small-sized firms. In particular, a large 
fraction of just started new firms are not included, even though these firms may be very 
important sources of innovation.
14  
Statistics Netherlands collects the CIS-data every two years, but the survey spans a three 
year period. Several variables in this survey provide information on the total three year survey 
period. Due to this construction of the survey, variables cover information in overlapping years 
as the survey is conducted each two years. However, our variables of interest are only available 
for the last (third) year of each wave of the survey. This implies that the information on 
innovation is discontinuous and that this will hamper the analysis of taking account of dynamic 
effects.  
Table 3.1  Characteristics of PS-data, PS-CIS-data compared to total population, 1996 and 2000
a 
  Survey-PS  PS-CIS   Population 
       
2000       
Average firms size in full time equivalents  48.4  300.9  5.5 
       
  x 1000     
Number of firms   3.9  0.3  85.7 
Labour productivity per full-time equivalent  32.5  34.6  30.4 
       
       
1996       
Average firms size in full time equivalents  46.0  180.7  5.1 
       
  x 1000     
Number of firms   4.0  0.4  86.0 
Labour productivity per full-time equivalent  31.7  30.5  26.8 
        a
 Survey PS are data derived from the PS, PS-CIS are matched data from PS and CIS, Population data are derived form Statline CBS. 
 
Merging of datasets reduces coverage 
To make assertions on the relationship between competition, innovation, and productivity we 
merge the PS-data and CIS-data into one data set. This merging, however, reduces the number 
of observations.
15 In total the merged data set covers yearly a meagre 0.5 per cent of the total 
population. Yet, more than 1000 observations remain for the analysis. The low coverage of 
 
14 Although the sample is continuously updated with young firms, those firms will pop up with a certain delay. 
15 This loss of information arises due to sampling of firms. Only firms present in both sets can be used for our analysis.  
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firms in the CIS-dataset could underestimate the importance of innovation in the retail trade. In 
Table 3.1 we provide several statistics which reveal that, when compared to the population or 
the PS-data, this merged set consists of very large firms. However, their productivity levels are 
in line with those of the PS-data. 
 
Seen from an international perspective the number of observable firms is still large. 
Additionally, an international comparison of innovation activities is unfortunately not possible 
for the retail trade, as this sector is frequently missing in CIS-data for other countries. Despite 
both shortcomings, CIS-data remain imperative for assessing the role of innovation and the 
interaction between competition, innovation and productivity (growth). 
3.2  Descriptive statistics competition, innovation and productivity 
The (merged) datasets discussed above provide several indicators on the extent of competition 
and innovation in the Dutch retail trade. In this section we present two indicators, together with 
the average productivity growth of the Dutch retail trade derived from the Production Statistics. 
These indicators will be used to determine the relations between competition, innovation and 
productivity growth in chapter 4. 
3.2.1  Competition 1993-2002 
In this study, the developments in competition are mapped by the relative profits measure 
(RPM, see Boone, 2000). The RPM is a measure on the performance of firms, and rests on the 
assumption that firms in an industry mutually differ in their marginal costs. Fiercer competition 
can be observed by a steeper slope of the relation between firms’ relative profits and relative 
levels of productivity. In fact, rising competition induces firms to exploit their efficiency 
advantage as much as possible. Then, efficient firms are more rewarded and attain relatively 




We calculate the RPM for each industry in the Dutch retail trade at the SIC 5-digit level by 
using the PS-data. Figure 3.1 ranks all industries within the Dutch retail trade according to their 
trend growth. The figure reveals that the changes in competition are rather heterogeneous. 
About 40% of these industries demonstrate a decline in competition, and the other 60% an 
increase. In addition, changes in the intensity of competition are of a different magnitude. Note 
 
16 The literature provides additional indicators like the familiar price-cost margin (PCM). The PCM denotes firms’ ability to set 
prices above marginal costs. It may serve as a competition indicator, because fiercer competition is reflected by lower prices 
and lower price-cost margins. In fact, if there are many competitors on a market with a low level of demand, then competition 
forces the firms to reduce prices until marginal costs. In this study we focus on the RPM. However, to obtain insights on the 




also that in figure 3.1 the industries have different sizes, and vary for example from small 
cheese stores to large supermarkets. 































decrease in competition increase in competition
 
To obtain an indication of competition development for the whole retail trade, we aggregate the 
RPM of all industries, each weighed by its industry’s market share in the total sales of the 
Dutch retail trade.   
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Figure 3.2 presents this average RPM and its trend for the period 1993-2002. The average 
indicator suggests that competition is not constant over time. More precisely, competition 
dropped from 1993 to 1995, but recovered thereafter and stabilised until the late 1990s. At the 
start of the new millennium, competition declined again and only partly recovered in 2002.
17 
Overall, the trend of the average RPM suggests that competition in the retail trade demonstrated 
a small decline over the whole period. 
3.2.2  Innovation 1994-2000 
Table 3.2 presents some key statistics on innovation.
18 It points out that the number of firms 
with innovation expenditures is relatively low. Only a sixth to a third of the firms indicated to 
invest in innovations. The average innovation expenditure for all firms in the sample 
demonstrates an increase between CIS 2 and CIS 2.5, but remains stable between CIS 2.5 and 
CIS 3. In contrast, the average innovation expenditure for the innovating firms increased during 
the three consecutive periods.  
 
17 An analysis of competition development based on the price-cost margin and the Herfindahl index yields similar results as 
for the RPM. 
18 Note, these aggregated firm-level statistics may differ from the total population due to sampling of firms and the merging 




Table 3.2  Statistics on innovation CIS 2, 2.5 and 3
 
  CIS 2  CIS 2.5  CIS 3 
       
Number of firms in sample  425  447  275 
       
                          %     
Share of innovating firms   24  31  15 
       
                         ´ 1000 euro   
Average innovation expenditures for all firms in sample  122  190  196 
Average innovation expenditures for innovating firms  507  608  1350 
 
Source: own calculations based on CIS data. 
 
Innovations in retail trade mostly on processing 
One  may  divide  innovation  into  two  types,  process  and  product  innovations.  Concerning  the  retail  trade  product 
innovations  affect  the  store  concept,  for  example  switching  to  self-service,  or  selling  on  the  Internet.  Process 
innovations,  with  the  objective  of  increasing  efficiency,  include  for  instance  a  new  cash-register  system  and  an 
automated supply-management and stock system.  
Unfortunately, the CIS-innovation survey among firms in services does not make a distinction between product and 
process innovations. Retailers however were asked to provide descriptions on their innovation activities. An analysis of 
these innovation examples revealed that innovations in the retail trade mostly consist of process innovations.  
 
3.2.3  Productivity 1995-2002 
In section 2.2 we already discussed productivity levels of the Dutch retail trade for several 
periods in a national and international perspective. Figure 3.3 plots the average labour 
productivity levels per full-time equivalent for the whole retail trade between the years 1995 
and 2002, based on the PS-data. In this period, labour productivity hardly improved. Until 1998 
productivity significantly increased, thereafter productivity considerably declined. Productivity 
recovered again in 2002.  
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Source: own calculation based on PS-data. Productivity levels deflated by price mutations derived from the input-output tables of the 
national accounts (1992=100). 
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4  Competition, Innovation and Productivity 
The findings suggest that some regulatory reforms seems to go along with intensified competition. In 
contrast, considerable growth of market demand may have weakened competition. Additionally, more entry 
increased the competitive pressure on the Dutch retail trade markets. Further, the regression results reveal 
that competition has a positive effect on innovation. These estimations also confirm that both competition 
and innovation may directly stimulate productivity growth. So eventually, more competition in Dutch retail 
trade enhances productivity growth directly, but also indirectly via innovations.  
4.1  Introduction 
Theoretically, both competition and innovation are important drivers of productivity (growth). 
Our conceptual framework is presented in figure 4.1, which captures the mutual relation 
between competition, innovation and productivity. This framework includes the direct impact of 
competition and innovation on productivity as well as the impact of competition on innovation. 











An increase in competition may force firms to achieve the highest level of efficiency in 
production and management, given available technologies. This is often referred to as static 
efficiency. That is, increasing competition may reduce various forms of X-inefficiency like 
managerial slack, and subsequently enhance the level of static efficiency in the market (see, e.g. 
Nickell, 1996). In addition, innovations may affect efficiency levels in the (near) future and 
stimulate the level of dynamic efficiency of the market (see, e.g. Baumol, 2003). 
 
Competition and innovation are also interrelated. Aghion et al. (2001 and 2002) illustrate that 
this relationship include two counteracting effects. Combining these two effects may result in 
an inverted U-relationship (see section 4.3). However, still no consensus exists in the theoretical 




al., 2005). Therefore our analysis of this relationship is of an explorative type and assesses 
whether the Dutch retail trade is characterised by an inverted U-relationship or a linear 
relationship between competition and innovation. 
 
Our conceptual model neglects two (feedback) mechanisms as we do not apply a simultaneous 
model explaining competition, innovation and productivity at once. First, we assume that 
innovation does not effect competition directly in the short term. If innovation affects 
competition, this will be in the long term via productivity increases or product differentiation. 
Second, we ignore a direct effect from productivity on competition. Our measure of 
competition, the RPM (see section 3.2.1), is based on relative marginal costs. In a special case 
these relative marginal costs are the reverse ratio of labour productivity. This implies that 
changes in productivity are captured by our measure of competition.  
 
We will elaborate on the theoretical notions and empirical findings of the explanation of 
competition, the interaction between competition and innovation, and finally the impact of 
competition and innovation on productivity in respectively subsections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4.
19  
 
4.2  Explanation competition development 
4.2.1  Theoretical assertions on competition 
Policy frequently considers more competition as a stimulus of economic growth. In that sense, 
policy has taken various measures to enhance competitive forces on the product markets, also in 
the Dutch retail trade (see section 2.3). 
 
However, we cannot directly identify effects of regulatory reforms on competition in the Dutch 
retail trade. Still, we may obtain indications for such effects by investigating possible shifts in 
the level of competition after a reform occurred. For example, such a shift may occur after the 
reforms on opening hours and business licensing in 1996 and after the introduction of the 
competition act in 1998.  
 
In addition to regulatory reforms, other determinants may affect competition as well. Therefore, 
in line with Creusen et al. (2006b) we include five additional explanatory variables to explain 
competition development: entry, exit, market demand, strategic interaction and advertising.
20 
More entry is expected to have a positive impact on competition and more exit a negative 
impact. The decision to enter or to exit the market is not exogenous but depends on other 
 
19 In the main text of this study we focus on the RPM. However, to obtain insights on the robustness of our analysis, in 
appendix C we report results of our analysis with the PCM as indicator of competition. 
20 We ignore the impact of import on competition because import by the retail trade is not present according to the National 
Accounts.   
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determinants.
21 An increase in market demand due to economic growth reduces competition 
(and vice versa).
22 Then all firms can set higher prices without being impeded by competitors’ 
price cutting.  
 
Formal model for explaining competition 
The competition model exists of two steps. The second step is the subject of this section: explanation of competition. 
The first step concerns the pre-determination of entry and exit. After taking logarithms of each variable, the regression 
equation for the relative profits measure (RPM) of industry j in period t reads as follows: 
tj tj tj tj tj tj ,j t tj tj tj ε Dca β Dob β SI β ADV β MD β RPM β Exit β Entry β β RPM + + + + + + + + + = - 8 7 6 5 4 1 3 2 1 0  
with   Entry  estimated number of entrants as percentage of total number of firms 
         Exit     estimated number of exiting firms as percentage of the total number of firms 
        MD       market demand, i.e. total sales adjusted for supply-side effects 
        ADV     advertising rate, i.e. advertising costs as percentage of total sales 
        SI         dummy on strategic interaction
 a 
        Dob      dummy on the liberalization of shop opening hours and business licence requirements (1996 and later)  
        Dca      dummy on the new Competition Act (1998 and later) 
 
The lagged RPM may capture the slack of incumbents’ response to previous changes in the determinants. The fitted 
values of entry and exit ( Entry and Exit ) capture the joint effects of all other determinants on competition that go 
through entry and exit. These predicted values are obtained from two other equations, which are used to solve for the 
issue of endogeneity. In fact, we also regressed the entry rate (Entry ) and exit rate ( Exit  ) on all the other lagged 
determinants. In these equations we used a one year lag, because it is likely that entry and exit only take place if the 
change in the determinant becomes more settled and definite. Stated formally, we estimated: 
tj ,j t ,j t ,j t ,j t ,j t ,j t ,j t ,j t tj µ Exit γ RPM γ Dca γ Dob γ ADV γ TS γ DEP γ Entry γ γ Entry + + + + + + + + + = - - - - - - - - 1 8 1 7 1 6 1 5 1 4 1 3 1 2 1 1 0
tj ,j t ,j t ,j t ,j t ,j t ,j t ,j t ,j t tj ν Entry δ RPM δ Dca δ Dob δ ADV δ TS δ DEP δ Exit δ δ Exit + + + + + + + + + = - - - - - - - - 1 8 1 7 1 6 1 5 1 4 1 3 1 2 1 1 0  
with TS      (deflated) total sales of the Dutch market 
       DEP    capital intensity, measured by depreciation costs as percentage of total sales 
 
The equations can be estimated in two sequential steps by the Ordinary Least Squares-technique. This procedure is 




 A positive and significant correlation between the RPM and the price-cost margin points to the existence of reallocation effects, i.e. 
when changes in competition also induce shifts in market shares (see Creusen et al., 2006b). These reallocation effects, however, 
typically emerge if competition is altered by changes in strategic interaction. So, simultaneous increases (decreases) in the RPM and the 
price-cost margin point to an increase (decrease) in firm’s strategic interaction. 




21 I.e. including capital intensity as an indicator of the level of economies of scale. In fact, the contestability theory suggests 
that higher capital intensity and more economies of scale induce fewer firms on the market.  
22 We approximate changes in market demand by adjusting the total sales for supply-side effects, such as changes in 




In contrast, competition may increase if strategic interaction intensifies, i.e. when firms react 
more aggressively to their opponents in using their competitive advantages. Finally, advertising 
has an ambiguous impact on competition. In fact, advertising can raise competition if it 
increases market transparency, but may also reduce competition if it lowers product 
substitutability and effectively raises an entry barrier. 
 
To investigate the effects of the explanatory variables on competition, we apply the two stage 
model from Creusen et al. (2006b, see also the box above). Using PS-data, we estimate this 
model at the SIC 5-digit level.  
 
4.2.2  Empirical findings on competition 
Table 4.1 presents the regression results and shows that the signs of most coefficients of the 
explanatory variables fit well with the theoretical assertions as depicted above. Increases in 
strategic interaction and advertising have a significant positive impact on competition in the 
Dutch retail trade. The positive impact of advertising suggests that advertising is used to inform 
consumers in order to enhance market transparency and hence to intensify competition. A larger 
market demand reduces competition, which was the case during the booming economy in the 
late 1990s. In addition, the significant and positive parameter of the lagged competition 
indicator suggests that effects of changes in determinants and entry/exit rates last for multiple 
periods. 
Table 4.1  Estimation results for determinants of competition in the Dutch retail trade, 1993-2002 
Dependent variable: RPM       
       
Determinant  Expected sign
a  Estimated parameter  t-value 
       
Regulatory reforms       
Dummy 1996 on opening hours/ 
                           business licensing  +  0.12  2.66 
Dummy 1998 on Competition Act  +  – 0.01  – 0.30 
       
(Fitted) entry rate   +   0.06  1.54 
(Fitted) exit rate  -   – 0.05  – 0.68 
Market demand  -  – 6.94  – 3.72 
Strategic interaction  +  0.05  3.90 
Advertising rate  ?  0.13  2.61 
       
Lagged RPM  +  0.42  11.55 
       
Intercept    0.40  2.46 
       
R-squared    0.26   
Degrees of freedom    563   
 
a
 Positive sign indicates positive effect on competition, and visa versa.  
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Joint effects of regulatory reforms 
Table  4.1  presents the  results  with separate  year  dummies  to  capture  the  joint  effect  of  the liberalization  of  shop 
opening hours and the business licensing requirements in 1996, and the effect of the enactment of the new Competition 
Act in 1998.  
One can also combine the separate reforms in an overall indicator on regulatory reform.
1 In this way we get an overall 
view  of  the  impact  of  regulation  on  competition,  which  implicitly  includes  the  complementarity  of  several  types  of 
reforms. Still, the weighing of the separate regulatory reforms is somewhat debatable. In a first attempt to combine the 
separate  reforms,  we  assume  that  the  two  reforms  in  1996  had  an  equivalent  effect  on  competition  as  the  new 
Competition Act in 1998. By this assumption, we can construct the overall indicator on regulatory reforms by simply 
adding the two year-dummies of 1996 and 1998. The table below presents the results of a regression of the RPM 
including the overall indicator on regulatory reforms. The results suggest that the regulatory reforms had a positive and 
significant impact on competition. 
 
Estimation results for determinants of competition in the Dutch retail trade, 1993-2002 
Determinant  Expected sign
a  Estimated parameter  t-value 
       
Indicator on regulatory reforms  +  0.05  2.29 
       
(Fitted) entry rate   +   0.07  1.74 
(Fitted) exit rate  -   - 0.07  - 0.86 
Market demand  -  - 6.60  - 3.56 
Strategic interaction  +  0.05  3.87 
Advertising rate  ?  0.10  1.91 
       
Lagged RPM  +  0.42  11.49 
       
Intercept    0.52  3.27 
       
R-squared    0.26   
Degrees of freedom    564   
  a Positive sign indicates positive effect on competition, and visa versa. 
 
1 In a similar way, for each OECD-country the OECD has constructed an overall indicator on regulation by weighing and adding up the 
impact specific regulatory reforms (see Nicoletti et al., 2000, and Boylaud, 2000). However, these indicators are based on a single survey 
across all the countries (in 1996), and only take a snapshot on the intensity of regulation at one moment. 
 
In addition, our findings indicate that some regulatory reforms might have affected competition 
positively in the Dutch retail trade. The dummy variable for the period following the reforms on 
opening hours and business licensing, demonstrates that a significant upward shift in the level 
of competition occurred. However, such a shift is not identified after the introduction of the 
competition act in 1998. Further research is required to identify the effect of both regulatory 
reforms on the level of competition in the Dutch retail trade. 
 
4.2.3  Conclusion 
The regression results provide preliminary insights into the impact of a number of explanatory 




Creusen et al. (2006b) who examined the competition development across 119 Dutch industries 
at the 3-digit level. Considerable growth of market demand and more exits may have weakened 
competition in the Dutch retail trade. In addition, regulatory reforms seem to go along with an 
increase in competition. 
4.3  Relation innovation and competition 
4.3.1  Theoretical assertions on innovation 
Recent theory suggests that the incentive to innovate depends on the level of competition and 
the differences in efficiency level between competing firms (see Aghion et al., 2001 and 2002, 
Boone, 2001). It particularly shows that two countervailing effects determine the relation 
between competition and innovation.
23 On the one hand, an increase in competition enhances 
the innovative effort of leading firms, because in this way these firms can escape from fierce 
competition (escape competition effect). On the other hand, increases in competition forces 
lagging firms to refrain from innovation, because those innovations become non-profitable 
(Schumpeter effect). The escape competition effect therefore points to a positive relation 
between competition and innovation. However, the Schumpeter effect points to a negative 
relation. 
 
Aghion et al. suggest however, that combining these two effects in a dynamic model results in 
an inverted U-relationship between competition and innovation (see Aghion et al., 2001 and 
2002). In fact, an initial rise in competition will first enhance total innovation efforts by the 
escape competition effect, but beyond some point it will reduce total innovative efforts as the 
Schumpeter effect becomes larger. Further, lower differences in efficiency levels would amplify 
the inverted U-relations. To test whether an inverted U-relationship exists, we run three 
different variants of the innovation expenditure equation (see the box below for more details).  
 
When estimating the relationship between competition and innovation, one should be aware of 
the various steps firms have to go through in deciding to innovate. Recall that more than 70 
percent of the retailers in our sample indicated that they had no innovation expenditures. 
Ignoring this group of non-innovative retailers and only focussing on the 30 percent of the 
retailers that do innovate may bias our empirical results on the relation between competition and 
innovation. So to capture all relevant innovation decision of all retailers, we employ the Tobit-I 
procedure and implicitly combine the decision to innovate in the first step with the decision on 
expenditures in the second step. As a result, the parameter estimates have now two 
 
23 These effects denoted by Aghion et al. resemble the famous Schumpeter’s mark I and mark II, in the sense that there are 
two countervailing effects of competition on innovation. Schumpeter’s mark I argues that more competition stimulates (all) 
firms to innovate (see Schumpeter, 1934). Schumpeter’s mark II, however, argues that too much competition may reduce 
innovation, because firms must have sufficient size and financial sources to benefit from innovation (see Schumpeter, 1942).  
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interpretations. First they demonstrate an effect on the probability of innovation and second an 
effect on the relative innovation expenditures. Consequently, the impact of competition and 
market share on those expenditures, that is the marginal effects, are dependent on the 
probability of innovation. 
 
Formal equation explaining innovation 
To determine the dominant effect (escape competition or Schumpeter), the linear relation between competition and 
innovation for each firm i in industry j in period t reads as: 
 
ijt jt ijt W RPM IS 3 1 0 j j j + + =  
 
with IS         innovation rate, i.e. the firm’s innovation expenditures as a percentage of its total sales 
        RPM    relative profits measure of the industry 
        W         market share, i.e. total sales of each firm as a percentage of the total sales of the industry 
 
This equation includes the firm’s market share as an explaining variable as firms may have exploit economies of scale 
from innovation. It is expected that larger firms have more opportunities to conduct research, such as financial funds or 
risk-sharing, or can better exploit economies of scale after implementing the innovation. Therefore, firms with a higher 
market share may also have more innovation expenditures in comparison to their sales. 
Following Aghion et al. (2002) the relation between competition and innovative effort can be estimated by regressing the 
innovation rate of each firm on a quadratic function of the RPM of the respective industry. 
The regression equation for the innovation rate becomes:  
ijt jt jt ijt W RPM RPM IS 3
2
2 1 0 j j j j + + + =  
We also investigate the impact of the average productivity gap, as a lower productivity gap between firms entails a 
stronger impact of competition on innovation (see Aghion et al., 2001 and 2002). In that sense we added a cross term 
which multiplies the quadratic function of RPM by the average productivity gap (PG):  
( )( ) ijt jt jt jt ijt W PG ψ RPM RPM IS 3
2
2 1 0 1 j j j j + + + + =  
with PG      productivity gap, i.e. the industry average deviation of firms’ productivity level from the average productivity  
                   level of the industry’s technological leaders
a 
 
Note that innovation outlays as an indicator of innovation are left censored, which means that these variables can only 
take values larger than or equal to zero. In estimating all the equations we have to take account of this censoring and 
therefore apply the so-called censored regression technique (Tobit-I model, see Verbeek, 2004). 
 
a To take account for potential outliers in productivity levels, the average leaders’ productivity level is defined as the average productivity 






Differences compared to the study of Aghion et al., 2002 
Aghion et al., (2002) attempted to find empirical evidence for the inverted U-relationship between competition and 
innovation for the UK. In this paper we follow their research methodology, but deviate on the following aspects: 
 
• Aghion et al. used the Lerner-index and the average price-cost margin as indicators of competition. In our paper we 
measure competition by the RPM. A drawback of the price-cost margin is that this measure may point to deviating 
changes in competition if the underlying determinants of these changes also enhance shifts in market shares (see 
Creusen et al., 2006a). 
• Aghion et al. use the number of (citation weighted) patents at firm level to denote the innovation effort of firms. This 
paper, however, measures innovation effort by firms’ total innovation expenditures relative to their total sales. Data on 
the number of firms’ patents are not present in the CIS- or PS-dataset. 
• To investigate the impact of the productivity gap, Aghion et al. consider only two sub samples of industries with an 
average TFP-gap above or below the median of all industries. In this paper we add a cross term between the average 
total labour productivity gap and the square function of competition. In this way we can instantly catch the impact of the 
productivity gap on the relation between competition and innovation.  
• In contrast to Aghion et al., we do not consider the issue of endogeneity of competition with respect to innovation. We 
assume that the effect of innovation on competition will be in the long term. 
• Aghion et al. consider 19 two-digit industries in manufacturing. This paper, however, focuses on the retail trade sector 
for two reasons. First, by focussing on one industry we avoid intertwining results from several industries that may 
counteract  with  each  other.  Focussing  on  one  industry  reduces  the  probability  of  ambiguous  results.  Second,  we 
particularly focus on the retail trade sector to investigate the lack and/or potential of competition and innovation for 
productivity growth (see section 2.2). 
• Aghion et al. also investigates the impact of financial pressure, measured as the ratio of debt payments to total cash 
flow,  on  the  inverted  U-relationship. We  have  no  data  on the  financial  pressure  of  firms  in the  Dutch  retail trade, 
However, we catch firms’ financial strength and their ability to cover risks by their size, measured as their market share. 
 
4.3.2  Empirical findings on innovation 
We use the firm’s innovation expenditures as a percentage of total sales as an indicator of 
innovation activities in the Dutch retail trade. Although, for example, the decision to exit the 
market is also a decision not to innovate, we will not analyse the impact of such effects 
separately. Furthermore, we assume that effects of legislation, strategic interaction, entry and 
exit are all captured by changes in the RPM as our indicator of competition.  
 
The analysis of innovation partly consists of firm-level data (i.e. innovation expenditures and 
market share) as well as industry-level data (i.e. RPM and average productivity gap). In 
addition, the RPM, market share and the average productivity gap are pre-determined on PS-
data at the industry level (5-digit). 
 
Table 4.2 presents the results of the estimated linear relation between innovations expenditures 
and competition. Remember that the coefficients of a Tobit-I model have two interpretations.  
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So these estimations results indicate that higher competition induces a higher probability of 
innovation as well as a higher ratio of innovation expenditures relative to the sales levels of firm 
i (positive sign of competition).
24 Then in terms of the theory (see section 4.3.1), these results 
suggest that the escape competition effect dominates in the Dutch retail trade, i.e. some 
(leading) firms innovate to escape fierce competition. Further, the empirical results also point 
out that firms with a higher market share spend relatively more on innovation than firms with a 
lower market share.
25 
Table 4.2  Estimation results for Innovation (Tobit-I model) 
Dependent variable: innovation rate (at firm level)       
       
Determinant    Estimate  t-value
 
       
Intercept    - 0.14  9.08 
RPM    0.02  4.31 
Market share    0.24  5.14 
       
Scale parameter
a      21.63 
Number of observations      1147 
Left-censored observations      864 
Log-likelihood      - 72.9 
  a Scale parameter in the distribution used to normalise the underlying variable. 
Source: own calculations based on PS- and CIS-data. 
 
Additionally, we test the existence of an inverted U-relationship. The results do not support the 
theoretical notions of this relationship. Appendix B provides the empirical results. Even the 
augmented model, which also includes the impact of the average productivity gap, does not 
indicate a quadratic relationship between innovation and competition. 
4.3.3  Conclusion 
Our study provides preliminary insights on the relation between innovation and competition in 
the Dutch retail trade. It finds a positive and linear relationship between innovation and 
competition, despite theoretical notions of the existence of an inverted U-relationship. 
Stimulating competition seems therefore to be conducive for innovation. 
 
The results for innovation should however be interpreted with care. First, innovation is a 
difficult concept, particularly in service-related industries. The distinction between product and 
process innovations is hard to make and is to some extent also related to investments in physical 
 
24 Parameters of the Tobit-I model cannot directly be interpreted as the marginal effect on innovation because the probability 
of having a positive outcome should also be taken into account. We therefore focus on the sign of the estimates and not on 
the magnitude. 
25 Although it can be argued that there is a relationship between market shares and the relative profit measure, the 





capital. Second, our model used innovation expenditures to measure the intensity of (successful) 
innovations. Innovation expenditures, however, are an input measure, and reliable output 
measures of innovations at the firm level are not available for the Dutch retail trade. Finally, 
due to data availability, we had to use the same explanatory variables for the decision to 
innovate and for the amount of innovation expenditures of innovating firms.  
Formal equation of productivity  




ijt ijt ijt L K A Y =  
 with Y      deflated value added (i.e. total sales minus material inputs),  
        K       deflated capital expenditures (approximated by deflated depreciation) 
        L        labour in hours worked  
 
We assume that the elasticities of capital and labour ( l k, ) do not vary over time or across firms within the respective 
industry. However, total factor productivity of each firm (A) is allowed to grow independently over time.  
Following  Solow,  we  can  rewrite  the  firms’  production  function  to  a  decomposition  of  a  firm’s  change  in  labour 
productivity (=p) in contributions of changes in capital intensity, shifts in the firm’s size (in terms of employed staff) and 
TFP growth (with  x D denoting the delta logarithm which approaches the annual percentage change of variable X) : 
 
( ) ( ) ijt j j ijt ijt j ijt ijt ijt ijt l l k a l y p D - + + D - D + D = D - D º D 1 l k k  
 
Note that the parameter on firm size specifies whether the firms in industry j can benefit from increasing economies of 
scale if  0 1 > - + j j l k (and visa versa). We assume that A depends on the stock of knowledge (say S), the intensity of 
competition (measured by RPM) and some growing trend : 
jt RPM ν ijt S ν t ν
ijt e A
2 1 0 + + = with  0 0 0 2 1 0 > >   > ν , ν , ν  
Further we assume that stock of (internal) knowledge only increases with the firm’s innovative effort in the previous year 
approximated by each firm’s innovation expenditures as a percentage of its value added (IV)
a : 
   1 1 - - + = ij,t ij,t ijt IV µ S S  with  0 > m  
Combining the latter two equations gives an expression for the TFP-growth: 
 
( ) jt ijt ijt ∆RPM ν IV µ ν ν ∆a 2 1 1 0 + + = -   
Note that ν0 captures the impact of external knowledge. Implementing this latter expression in the productivity equation, 
including two year dummies to capture incidental effects and after some rewriting, we arrive at: 
 
( ) 2001 6 1999 5 4 3 2 1 1 0 D φ D φ l ∆ φ ∆l ∆k φ ∆RPM φ IV φ φ ∆p ijt ijt ijt jt ijt ijt + + + - + + + = -  




Note that we assume that there is no depreciation of knowledge. 
b Serial correlation may occur for the firms within the SBI 5-digit sectors (see Moulton, 1986) and on a higher level in the cross-sections of 
these sectors. However, this issue is beyond the scope of this paper.  
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4.4  Impact competition and innovation on productivity 
4.4.1  Theoretical assertions on productivity 
In general firms’ labour productivity depends on amongst others total factor productivity (TFP), 
capital intensity, use of economies of scale, and on cyclical fluctuations. In this study, the first 
determinant, TFP, is most crucial. In fact, we assume that firms may enhance their TFP-level by 
innovation, that is, by conducting research to develop new technologies and/or new products. 
Furthermore, theory suggests that fierce competition forces firms to reduce X-inefficiency as 
much as possible, and consequently affects TFP-growth in the short term (see for instance 
Nickel, 1996, for an overview). Weak competition makes managers and employees lax, or even 
seduces managers and employees to shirk. Therefore, in our model we assume that TFP-growth 
in the short term is not only related to innovation, but to competition as well. 
 
These relations described above are transformed in a formal model (see box), and can be 
estimated empirically. As labour productivity is highly correlated with the business cycle due to 
labour hoarding, we added two year dummies (i.e. for the year 1997 respectively 1999) to 
control for incidental effects, including business cyclical effects.  
4.4.2  Empirical findings on productivity 
Estimation of the productivity equation is based on the merged data set of PS and CIS-data at 
the firm level. The set of the RPM are pre-determined from the PS-data at the 5 digit industry 
level. Due to the restrictive availability of the innovation data and the assumed lagged effect of 
innovation, these joined data concern the years 1997, 1999 and 2001.  
 
The positive and significant coefficients for competition and innovation reveal that they both 
enhance TFP-growth, as can be seen in table 4.3. The positive effect of competition on the 
productivity growth is in line with the findings of Nickell (1996), and indicates that the market 
attains higher static efficiency with increasing competition. The positive effect of innovation on 
productivity growth is supported as well (dynamic efficiency). The insignificance of the 
coefficient on labour indicates that the Dutch retail trade as a whole is characterised by constant 




Table 4.3  Estimation results labour productivity growth, 1997-2001
a 
Dependent variable: productivity growth (at firm level)     
     
Determinant  Estimate  t-value 
     
Intercept  - 0.02  - 0.61 
     
Change RPM  0.07  1.91 
Lagged innovation rate
b 
0.01  2.19 
     
Capital intensity  0.22  12.95 
Labour  - 0.00  - 0.45 
     
Dummy 1999  - 0.04  - 0.93 
Dummy 2001  0.05  1.09 
     
R-squared    0.17 
Degrees of freedom    877 
  a
 Note that only the growth rates of the years 1997, 1999, and 2001 can be used due to the CIS-data. 
b
 Relative to (lagged) value added. 
Source: own calculations based on PS- and CIS-data. Productivity levels deflated by price indices derived from the input-output tables of 
the national accounts (1992=100). 
 
4.4.3  Conclusion 
The empirical results confirm the assertion that competition may directly stimulate firms to 
attain higher productivity levels, and may thus enhance the static efficiency in the retail trade 
sector. In addition, the general idea that innovation is an important driver behind productivity 
growth is supported as well.  
 
Combining the positive impact of innovation on productivity with the positive impact of 
competition on innovation suggests that competition has a second indirect effect on productivity 
growth via innovation. If indeed competition leads to higher innovation incentives, the initial 
effect of competition on productivity becomes even stronger in the long term.   
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Appendix A  Estimation results entry and exit 
In section 4.2 competition is explained using several explanatory variables including entry and 
exit. The latter two variables are endogenous and partially depend on competition. Therefore we 
used a two-stage least squares method which also estimates the impact of the explanatory 
variables on entry and exit. The estimation results for entry and exit are reported in the two 
tables below. For the exit rate, a trend is included to control for the strong decline in the number 
of firms that is not caused by the other explanatory variables. This trend is not noticeable in the 
entry rate. 
Table A.1  Estimation results for entry 
Dependent variable: entry rate     
     
Determinant
a  Estimated parameter  t-value 
     
Regulatory reforms     
    Lagged dummy 1996 on opening hours/business licensing  – 0.11  – 2.49 
    Lagged dummy 1998 on Competition Act  – 0.29  – 2.87 
Lagged total sales (deflated)  2.53  2.52 
Lagged capital intensity/depreciation  - 0.06  - 0.97 
Lagged advertising rate   0.02   0.34 
Lagged RPM  0.08  2.19 
Lagged exit rate  0.04  1.09 
Lagged entry rate  0.79  29.67 
     
Intercept  – 11.19  – 2.46 
     
R-squared    0.69 
Degrees of freedom    563 





Table A.2  Estimation results for exit 
Dependent variable: exit rate      
     
Determinant
  Estimated parameter  t-value 
     
Regulatory reforms     
    Dummy 1996 on opening hours/business licensing  0.19  4.90 
    Dummy 1998 on Competition Act  – 0.35  – 3.99 
Lagged total sales (deflated)  7.11  5.61 
Lagged Capital intensity/depreciation  - 0.02  – 0.42 
Lagged advertising rate  – 0.08  – 2.11 
Lagged RPM  0.02  0.58 
Lagged entry rate  0.14  6.60 
Lagged exit rate  0.52  17.10 
     
Trend  – 0.17  – 7.10 
     
Intercept  – 31.98  – 5.54 
     
R-squared    0.53 
Degrees of freedom    562 
 
We briefly discuss the findings in tables A1 and A2, which show that the entry and exit levels 
demonstrate a significant shift after 1996 and 1998. These shifts may be related to the 
regulatory reforms in both years. The change to longer opening hours correlates with more exits 
but remarkably less entry. Moreover, the new Competition Act goes along with significantly 
less entry and less exit. Although beyond the scope of this document, further research is 
required on how regulatory reforms affect entry and exit and, subsequently, affect competition 
in the Dutch retail trade.  
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Appendix B  Estimation of inverted U-relationship 
This appendix provides the results of estimating a non-monotone relation between competition 
and innovation. According to the theory from Aghion et al. (2002), this relation might follow an 
inverted-U relationship.  
 
Following the abridged model of section 4.3.1, table B.1 presents the results of a regression of 
the innovation rate on a quadratic function of competition and the firm’s market share. These 
results suggest that that there is no inverted U-relationship between competition and innovation. 
The estimated coefficient of competition squared, i.e.  2 j  in the notation of section 4.3.1, is 
positive and significant, and thus contrasts with the theory of Aghion et al. (2002). 
Table B.1   Estimation of quadratic model (Tobit I) 
Determinant   Estimate  t-value 
     
Intercept  −0.07  −1.76 
RPM  −0.05  −1.50 
RPM squared   0.02  2.22 
Market share  0.24  4.59 
     
Scale parameter
a     21.65 
Number of observations     1147 
Left-censored observations     864 
Log-likelihood     - 70.46 
  a
 Scale parameter in the distribution used to normalise the underlying variable. 
Source: own calculations based on PS- and CIS-data.  
 
Table B.2 presents the regression results of the extended model, i.e. a regression of the 
innovation rate including the impact of the industry average productivity gap on the quadratic 
function of competition. These results again do not support the existence of an inverted U-
relationship. In fact, the average productivity gap for all industries is quite low. So for all 
industries and for all years, the joint coefficient of the squared RPM and the average 











Table B.2   Estimation of full quadratic model (Tobit I) 
Determinant   Estimate  t-value 
     
Intercept  0.59  1.82 
RPM  −0.70  −2.18 
RPM squared   0.16  2.24 
Gap  −1.17  −2.01 
Gap ´ RPM  1.17  2.02 
Gap ´ RPM squared  −0.27  −2.02 
Market share  0.24  5.12 
     
Scale parameter
a     21.67 
Number of observations     1147 
Left-censored observations     864 
Log-likelihood     - 68.03 
  a
 Scale parameter in the distribution used to normalise the underlying variable. 
Source: own calculations based on PS- and CIS-data.  
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Appendix C  Estimations with the price-cost margin 
We replicate the analysis of chapter 4 using the price-cost margin (PCM). For this purpose we 
calculate the PCM for each industry in the Dutch retail trade at the SIC 5-digit level using the 
PS-data. 
Regarding the explanation of competition, innovation and productivity, the estimation results 
with the PCM are similar to the results obtained with the RPM with regard the signs of the 
estimated parameters (see table C.1-C.3).
26 However, the significance of estimated parameters 
is much lower in case of the PCM as dependent variable. The findings for the PCM point to a 
non-significant shift in the level of competition after the reforms on opening hours and business 
licensing (see Table C.1). In addition, the models for explanation of innovation and productivity 
do no longer indicate a significant effect of competition (tables C2 and C3).
27  
 
The differences in significance of effects between the RPM and PCM may be related to the 
difference in both indicators. That is, due to reallocations in output the RPM and the PCM may 
point in different directions of competition (see Creusen et al., 2006a).  
Table C.1  Estimation results for determinants of competition in the Dutch retail trade, 1993-2002 
Dependent variable: PCM        
       
Determinant  Expected sign 
a  Estimated parameter  t-value 
       
Regulatory reforms       
Dummy 1996 on opening hours/ 
                            business licensing  –  0.01  0.49 
Dummy 1998 on Competition Act  –  0.00  0.04 
(Fitted) entry rate   –   −0.05  −2.36 
(Fitted)  exit rate  +   0.02  0.61 
Market demand  +  1.75  1.91 
Strategic interaction  +  0.02  4.08 
Advertising rate  ?  −0.12  −4.71 
       
Lagged PCM  +  0.73  26.44 
       
Intercept    −0.65  −7.07 
       
R-squared    0.66   
Degrees of freedom    563   
 
a
 Positive sign indicates a negative effect on competition, and visa versa. 
 
26 Remember that the signs of the explanatory variables for RPM should be mostly opposite to the ones for the PCM, 
because the two indicators measure changes in competition in the opposite way. The only exceptions are the parameters of 
the lagged indicators and the indicator on strategic interaction due to its definition. 
27 Note that a negative sign of the PCM in the regressions of the innovation and productivity growth points to positive impact 




Table C.2  Estimation results for Innovation (Tobit-I model) 
Dependent variable: innovation rate (at firm level)       
       
Determinant    Estimate  t-value
 
       
Intercept    – 0.07  – 3.42 
PCM    – 0.07  – 0.85 
Market share    0.19  4.28 
       
Scale parameter
a      21.56 
Number of observations      1147 
Left-censored observations      864 
Log-likelihood      - 82.1 
  a Scale parameter in the distribution used to normalise the underlying variable. 
Source: own calculations based on PS- and CIS-data. 
 
Table C.3  Estimation results labour productivity growth, 1997-2001
a 
Dependent variable: productivity growth (at firm level)     
     
Determinant  Estimate  t-value 
     
Intercept  - 0.02  - 0.73 
     
Change PCM  – 0.15  – 0.21 
Lagged innovation rate
b 
0.01  2.18 
     
Capital intensity  0.22  12.93 
Labour  - 0.00  - 0.51 
     
Dummy 1999   - 0.02  - 0.55 
Dummy 2001   0.05  1.17 
     
R-squared    0.17 
Degrees of freedom    877 
 
a Note that only the growth rates of the years 1997, 1999, and 2001 can be used due to the CIS-data. 
b Relative to (lagged) value added  
Source: own calculations based on PS- and CIS-data. Productivity levels deflated by price indices derived from the input-output tables of 
the national accounts (1992=100). 
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Appendix D  Competition across 5-digit industries 
The table below presents the industries in the Dutch retail trade at 5-digit level that are used in 
this Document. For each industry, the table also gives a quick glance at the intensity and 
changes of competition by presenting the level of the RPMs in 2002 and the annual trend-
growth of the RPMs over the period 1994-2002. Note that these industries refer to the Dutch 
market as a whole, and thus abstract from regional differences in competition. 
Table D.1        Changes in competition by 5-digit industries 
      RPM 
SIC-
code 
Name  Level 2002  Trend growth 
1994-2002 






52121  Department stores  2.84  – 0.11 
52122  Retail sale in non-specialized stores (no department stores)  2.23  – 3.74 
52210  Retail sale of potato’s, fruit and vegetables  1.39  – 0.90 
52221  Retail sale of meat and meat-products  1.87  0.89 
52222  Retail sale of flesh and poultry  0.67  – 11.69 
52230  Retail sale of fish, crustaceans and molluscs  1.38  1.48 
52241  Retail sale of bread, cakes and flour confectionery  2.13  1.00 
52242  Retail sale of sugar confectionery  2.29  14.63 
52250  Retail sale of alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages  1.87  7.54 
52260  Retail sale of tobacco products  1.07  2.01 
52271  Retail sale of cheese  1.41  0.44 
52272  Retail sale of natural food and health food products  1.94  7.85 
52273  Retail sale of foreign food  1.74  5.05 
52274  Retail sale of food in specialized stores n.e.c.  1.36  – 2.65 
52321  Chemist's  1.48  1.07 
52322  Retail sale of medical and orthopaedic goods  1.81  4.14 
52330  Retail sale of perfumes, cosmetics and toilet articles  2.29  2.37 
52411  Retail sale of fabrics  1.67  – 1.71 
52413  Retail sale of knitting wool, needle work and smallwares  1.52  – 1.87 
52421  Retail sale of men's clothing  2.14  3.36 
52422  Retail sale of women's clothing  1.88  – 2.83 
52423  Retail sale of children's clothing  2.82  6.12 
52424  Retail sale of clothing in non-specialized stores  1.88  – 5.39 
52425  Retail sale of underclothing, foundation etc.  1.73  5.83 
52426  Retail sale of fashion articles and jewellery  1.53  2.18 
52427  Supermarkets and retail sale in non-specialized stores with textiles predominating  1.59  5.86 
52431  Retail sale of footwear  1.60  0.43 
52432  Retail sale of leather goods  1.50  3.46 
52441  Retail sale of furniture  2.24  – 3.76 
52442  Retail sale of home furnishing textiles  1.34  – 6.32 
52443  Retail sale of lighting equipment  2.36  6.73 
52444  Retail sale in non-specialized stores with furnishing predominating  2.41  1.97 
52445  Retail sale of glassware, china and kitchenware  2.57  4.96 
52447  Retail sale in non-specialized stores with household goods predominating  1.42  – 6.87 




Table D.1     Continued 
       
52452  Retail sale of radio and television sets  2.07  1.55 
52453  Retail sale of sound recording media  2.74  6.78 
52455  Retail sale of spare parts for electrical household appliances  0.17  – 22.70 
52456  Retail sale in non-specialized stores with electrical household appliances, radio 





52457  Retail sale of musical instruments and music scores  2.44  5.21 
52458  Retail sale of sewing and knitting machines  0.41  – 13.95 
52461  Retail sale of hardware, plumbing and building materials  1.64  – 1.97 
52462  Retail sale of paint, paints and wallpaper  2.33  10.10 
52463  Retail sale of wooden building and gardening materials  2.54  5.17 
52465  Retail sale of kitchens  3.13  12.47 
52466  Retail sale of parquet, laminate and cork floors  2.76  16.16 
52467  Other retail sale of building materials in specialized stores  2.82  5.46 






52471  Retail sale of books, newspapers and magazines  1.68  – 5.83 






52481  Retail sale of photographic equipment and related services  1.90  1.80 
52482  Retail sale of spectacles and other optical goods  1.40  – 5.38 
52483  Retail sale of jewellery, watches and clocks  1.38  – 3.94 
52485  Retail sale of bicycles  1.15  8.27 
52487  Retail sale of sports and leisure goods (except aquatic goods)  1.79  0.90 
52488  Retail sale of camping equipment  1.47  8.45 
52489  Retail sale of caravans  1.78  3.60 
52491  Retail sale of flowers and plants, seeds and gardening supplies  1.41  – 4.28 
52492  Garden centres  2.28  – 2.62 
52493  Retail sale of pet animals, pet supplies and fishing articles  2.17  14.74 
52494  Retail sale of computers  0.84  – 11.14 
52495  Retail sale of games and toys  1.38  – 2.47 
52497  Retail sale of floor coverings  2.50  – 1.65 
52499  Other retail sale in specialized stores  1.90  7.62 
52501  Retail sale of antiques  0.60  – 7.67 
52503  Retail sale of second-hand goods (except clothing)  2.12  10.45 
 
 
 